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Abstract
This report describes the workshop on Assurance for Autonomous Systems for Avia-
tion that was held in January 2016 in conjunction with the SciTech 2016 conference
held in San Diego, CA. The workshop explored issues related to assurance for au-
tonomous systems and also the idea of trust in these systems. Specifically, we
focused on discussing current practices for assurance of autonomy, identifying bar-
riers specific to autonomy as related to assurance as well as operational scenarios
demonstrating the need to address the barriers. Furthermore, attention was given
to identifying verification techniques that may be applicable to autonomy, as well
as discussing new research directions needed to address barriers, thereby involving
potential shifts in current practices.
1 Introduction
In the near future, autonomy will play an important role in civil aviation, and its
applications will encompass a wide range of vehicles and platforms (e.g., from small
UAVs up to transport-class aircraft, from low speed to supersonic and hypersonic
aircraft etc.) as well as airspace operations, and vehicle health management sys-
tems. This infusion of autonomy is driven by a need to optimize airspace operations
in order to accommodate increasing traffic density (e.g., adaptive trajectory-based
operations, autonomous tugs, close parallel runways, and dynamic separation as-
surance), reduce operational costs to ensure that US operators can compete with
emergent countries, and enable new business models (e.g., fire fighting, UAS-based
package delivery, and precision aerial photography). In essence, virtually every com-
ponent of the National Airspace System will become increasingly autonomous. Yet
we need to enable this transition in a safe manner, and have techniques and processes
in place to ensure the safety of the public.
Autonomous systems are characterized by their ability to make and execute
decisions with reduced or no human intervention and by attributes such as self-
configuration, self-optimization, self-protection and self-healing. These systems
present new assurance challenges, and raise the following questions:
• Can current assurance methods address autonomy? Where are the
limits to current techniques and how can we go beyond them? Should we
limit the degree of autonomy when considering safety?
• Do we really need to sacrifice performance for assurance? Can we
drive towards a notion of performance-based assurance?
• How can we reason about human interaction with autonomous sys-
tems, especially when the autonomous system hands over control to the hu-
man?
• How do we provide assurance for existing systems, especially when
they were not originally developed to the required design assurance levels?
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• Can we address assurance challenges in less time than it takes today?
Can it be done without requiring a high-level of analytical skill on the part of
the practitioner?
The purpose of this workshop was to identify where the current state-of-the-
art lies in assuring increasingly autonomous systems, along with what research gaps
exist, as well as how NASA can work with all stakeholders to provide assurance tech-
niques that preserve the performance benefits of autonomy. The workshop included
participants who represent industry (manufacturers, retailers, services delivery op-
erators, air transportation experts, system designers and integrators), academia,
government organizations, and subject matter experts. Collaboration opportunities
were discussed towards aiding in the development and demonstration of assurance
techniques for increasingly autonomous systems.
The workshop was co-located with the SciTech 2016 conference in San Diego,
CA. It ran for two days, and encompassed for a total of four sessions:
• Wednesday 9am to 12:30pm: Describing Autonomy for System Assurance:
panel, lightning fast talks, and discussion.
• Wednesday 2pm to 5:30pm: Methods for Enabling Autonomy: talks by John
Valasek (Texas A&M, Director of the Center for Autonomous Vehicles and
Sensor Systems) and Eric Johnson (Georgia Tech, Lockheed Martin Associate)
Professor of Avionics Integration), followed by a break-out session.
• Thursday 9am to 12:00pm: Managing Key Issues for Assured Autonomy: talk
by Steven Young (NASA Langley Research Center), panel, and lightning fast
talks.
• Thursday 2pm to 5:30pm: Assurance Tools and Techniques for Trusted Au-
tonomy: panel, wrap up.
The following section summarizes our key findings while subsequent sections
provide more details about each session. The appendix lists the participants of the
workshop. Some people attended only a subset of the sessions. While reading the
rest of the report, the reader should keep in mind that we organized and focused
the workshop around the following points:
• Discussion of current practices for assurance of autonomy.
• Identification of barriers specific to autonomy as related to assurance, as well
as operational scenarios demonstrating the need to address these barriers.
• Identification of verification techniques that may be applicable to autonomy.
• Discussion of new research directions needed to address barriers, potentially
involving shifts in current practices.
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2 Key Findings
In this section we present some of the key findings from the workshop. This section
serves as a summary of prioritized points, selected by the workshop organizers,
and is by no means comprehensive. A detailed reading of the session particulars
is encouraged so that an informed and unbiased view can be drawn, and further
insights gained. Furthermore, the session transcripts can provide an archival source
of information regarding the topics and participation engendered by the workshop.
First among the gathered points is:
Verify not what system will do, but what system must not do.
This was a recurrent theme of the workshop. Existing V&V processes are focused
on what the system does, and whether it does so safely. The participants felt that
there needs to be a paradigm shift for autonomous systems. Given how much is
unknown about the system during the design and development stages of the life
cycle, many participants argued that V&V efforts should focus on ensuring that the
system does not exhibit incorrect or unsafe behaviors at runtime.
Incorporate probabilistic reasoning techniques, especially into models for V&V.
There is a need for advanced probabilistic reasoning support in V&V techniques,
(both spatial and temporal) for autonomous systems. There is a special need for
inferring models from data. Several presenters pointed out that formal methods lack
adequate support for reasoning probabilistically about autonomous systems, espe-
cially since such systems can exhibit stochastic or non-deterministic behavior (e.g.,
uncertainties in the operating environment, complex interactions between computa-
tional elements or environment, etc.).
Identify ramifications of a possible shift from certifying systems to licensing
systems (as for cars)?
The issue of licensing autonomous systems rather than certifying them came
up several times. Many participants drew a parallel between the certification of
these increasingly autonomous systems to that of humans driving cars: Humans
are trained and tested in order to obtain licenses for driving (operating) within
the transportation system. Licensing is a standardized process and as such, it can
improve driving quality and the handling of exceptional situations. This is an issue
that is very germane to the notion of trust.
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Provide new V&V methods for learning and adaptive systems.
One of the new features of autonomous systems is their focus on learning on-
the-fly; these systems may also learn off-line. The ability of a system to learn is
not addressed adequately by current certification standards. This topic is related
to the issue of detecting undesirable behavior in the sense that we would wish to
verify that the system does not learn incorrect or improper information, if we could
determine what such information is.
Provide new V&V methods for model-based software systems.
The use of model-based software development results in non-traditional software,
in which the rationale/logic is not necessarily reflected in the code (or the structure
of the code) but more in the models that are used to generate the code or that
are consulted at run-time. This presents new challenges that could be addressed
through testing, but at a high cost. Therefore one needs better and cheaper V&V
methods focused at the model level
Human-machine teaming issues are a barrier to autonomy assurance.
Human Machine teaming issues were identified as the largest barrier to develop-
ing standards for certifying increasingly autonomous systems. In general, there is a
consensus that autonomy on its own is hard to assure but is even harder when it
interacts with humans to accomplish a common goal.
Further complicating this issue is the fact that there is a need to understand how
to achieve high levels of assurance without the human functioning in a traditional
safety critical role. It has long been argued that it is unknown what the exact
contribution to safety the human really has. Further investigation into this topic is
required in order to properly assure autonomous systems.
Cyber-security can no longer be ignored in autonomous systems.
Cyber-security has been identified as a major concern for autonomous systems.
However, the role it will play in assurance, and the weight that it will be given
with respect to autonomous system safety, are still under debate. The full range
of assurance implications arising from cybersecurity issues is not yet understood.
However, it is unclear if cybersecurity concerns should explicitly be a part of cer-
tification standards for autonomous systems, or whether there exists an alternate
means by which they can be addressed.
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Study and draw from other fields currently employing autonomy, such as the
automotive and robotics industry.
The automotive industry has been cited as an example for the deployment of
autonomous systems. Some participants also brought up experiences with robots,
especially observing their behaviors during grand challenge competitions. There
is a consensus that we can learn from the experience garnered in these industries
when it comes to issues such as trust, understanding (which is related to trust), and
assurance.
3 Session 1: Describing Autonomy for System Assur-
ance
In this session, we aimed at surveying the state-of-the-art in assurance of au-
tonomous systems, as well as current practices used to achieve assured autonomy.
Topics that were addressed include a discussion of this years Workshop on Certifica-
tion of Non-Deterministic Systems, the recent NRC report on Autonomy Research
for Civil Aviation, along with discourse on current practices in the UAS industry as
well as at NASAs Autonomy Incubator.
We began with a panel discussion to explore these areas, via an interactive Q&A
session with the audience. This was followed by several lightning-fast (5 minutes)
talks on new ideas for describing and generating requirements for autonomous sys-
tems. Here follows a short summary of the session.
• Goals: Identify key requirements for autonomous systems that have critical
safety constraints
• Panel:
– Danette Allen (NASA Langley)
– Ella Atkins (University of Michigan)
– Andrew Lacher (MITRE)
– Lael Rudd (Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratories)
– Andy Thurling (AeroVironment)
• Audience: 70
• Strengths
– Industry perspective well represented
• Ideas (connective, knowledge sharing)
– Verify not what system will do, but what system will not do
– User sophistication is an influence/direct factor in the degree of autonomy
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• Examples
– Science missions
∗ natural interface, resistant to environment, object detection and clas-
sification, avoidance, obstacle under tree canopy
– Precision agriculture
– Solar-powered, high-altitude UAVs for internet
– Geofencing as a V&V/C case study
• Challenges
– UAVs
∗ Unpredictability of these complex systems makes them hard to un-
derstand and thus trust
∗ Also, lots of non-determinism in environment
– V&V
∗ Need more exhaustiveness than in testing
∗ Need to also verify interactions with humans (Theory of Mind)
∗ Prove that system will not do bad things
∗ Use runtime monitoring and then go to run-time assurance
– Certification
∗ Is licensing a good model? Demonstrate proficiency to generate trust
∗ Airworthiness vs. operational certification (mission implies environ-
ment, which brings non-determinism)
∗ Paradigm shift: certify that autonomous systems cannot do bad
things
∗ Might end up being driven by accountability and liability
3.1 Panel
This section presents our notes (not everything has been captured) on each of the
panelists presentations.
Danette Allen (NASA Langley)
Danette Allen runs the Autonomy Incubator at NASA Langley where her re-
search team experiments with robotic and aerial autonomous systems. Some of
the main points in her presentation were as follows: UAVs are systems and should
be designed as such from the start. The community needs more and better facili-
ties/testbeds to evaluate UAVs and accumulate data to drive our assurance require-
ments. For her work, all COAs are obtained based on the presence of a backup
remote pilot. She also highlighted the following two challenges: (1) Systems cannot
learn by analogy - as a consequence, autonomous systems can be very fragile and
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break often especially when something new and similar but not identical is encoun-
tered. It is important to make them more robust. (2) V&V for autonomy needs to
be more exhaustive than just testing.
Andy Thurling (AeroVironment)
Andrew J. Andy Thurling is a former test pilot for the Air Force and is now the
Director of Product Safety and Mission Assurance at AeroVironment in Simi Valley,
California. Some of the main points in his presentation were as follows: The word
Autonomy scares regulators, probably because of a lack of trust due to the associated
uncertainties. We should start with easy cases, e.g., precision agriculture (well-
known, confined environment) and solar-powered, high-altitude UAVs for internet,
and then work our way up to more challenging operations, e.g., package delivery.
Trust comes from knowing that the system will not misbehave.
His talk raised the comment that, when it comes to assurance, it boils down to
accountability and therefore this will drive regulation.
Lael Rudd (Lockheed Martin)
Lael Rudd works in the Intelligent Robotics Laboratory at Lockheed Martin
Advanced Technology Laboratories and provides support for autonomy programs at
Lockheed Martin. Here are some the main points in his talk: For manned/unmanned
teaming one needs the ability to incorporate the mental state of human systems and
the mental state of autonomous system. He is currently working on methods based
on the Theory of Mind. He also made the point that we should really separate
mission goals from decision-making, which is where the safety issues really are. In
autonomy, he sees the following open challenges: The role of humans in collaboration
with autonomy must be studied and analyzed. Theory of mind and belief logic were
discussed as framework possibilities. It is important to be able to link cognitive and
machine theories in a unified analysis framework. There is a lack of good, reliable
data; we also need good metrics. He proposes that the highest priorities should be
as follows:
• Understanding the behavior of adaptive/non-deterministic systems.
• Designing autonomous systems that operate without continuous oversight.
• Modeling and simulation, V&V and certification.
His talk brought the comment that goodness-of-fit is underlying the current
regulations. Lael Rudd agreed but he remarked that it is not the way people think
about it and it also does not catch the in-between. This brought up a discussion
about licensing, which demonstrates proficiency. This is the first time, but not the
last, when licensing was brought up as an alternative to certification for autonomy.
Andrew Lacher (MITRE)
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Andrew Lacher works at MITRE, at which he has a leadership role in defining
the MITRE Corporations research strategy in unmanned and autonomous systems.
Andrew gave a summary of the workshop on certification of non-deterministic sys-
tems held at MITRE, MacLean VA, in November 2016. The workshop brought the
certifiers to talk with the researchers and some of the main findings were as follows:
• The sources of non-determinism in autonomous systems are inputs, probabilis-
tic algorithms, adaptive/learning systems, and COTS.
• Autonomy example for certification: PrecisionHawk (a pilotless agricultural
UAV) in which a farmer can pick goals, but does not fly the UAV.
• FAA already has a sliding scale for safety (GA aircraft to transport aircraft),
which could be adapted for autonomy.
• We should change the certification paradigm and certify what the system will
not do because it is impossible to evaluate all conditions before deployment.
• Plausible architecture for facilitating assurance: deterministic modules can be
responsible for safety and the system can include the notion of safety nets.
Ensuing discussions to Andrew Lachers talk showed that there is a split in the
audience between certifying for airworthiness and certifying for use in missions.
Somebody also questioned that a human pilot can be seen as non-deterministic, so
why require deterministic modules for safety. The response was that no humans are
deterministic, but pilots are licensed (but not certified), which brought up again a
discussion about licensing, trust, and proficiency. Some questioned why the human
is put on a pedestal and not autonomy when there are autonomous safety systems
such as electronic geo-fencing (GF) (e.g., keep-out GF and keep-in GF).
3.2 Lightning Fast talks
We summarize very briefly the main points developed in 5-minute talks.
Devesh Bhatt (Honeywell Aerospace Labs)
Devesh Bhatt stated that humans are bad at monitoring. Automation should
work as a colleague. We need an automation paradigm shift to enable single-pilot
operations. Still all verification must be done with respect to requirements; therefore
we need good autonomy requirements.
Corey Ippolito (NASA Ames Research Center)
The UAV community seems to move away from the aviation community (which
echoed some earlier comments that IT companies are pushing the issue for UAVs
rather than the traditional aerospace companies). Corey Ippolito also presented the
UTM project developed at NASA to provide air traffic capabilities for UAVs.
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Greg Dorais (NASA Ames Research Center)
Greg Dorais asked what the difference is between automation and autonomy (is
it self-governing?). For him, autonomy encompasses the ability to manage risks: It
can identify a risk, manage it, and learn from its mistakes. That could be a key to
demonstrating the ability to reach proficiency, as is done when we license humans
for driving cars.
Tom Apker (Naval Research Laboratory)
Tom Apker is building a run-time monitoring system that provides an LTL-based
safety cage around autonomy. When the system is about to leave the cage, one can
implement safety measures. The work is using game theory to come up with the
controller and it can help prove that the system cannot go into unsafe situations.
Yu Gu (West Virginia University)
Yu Gu presented an analogy from the robotics world. In a robotic challenge, he
could not understand what the other robots were doing, which led him to state that
it is hard to predict the behavior of an autonomous system. Moreover, as he said,
if you do not understand something how can you trust it? He also questioned even
attempting the idea of assured autonomy in unstructured environments.
Florian Adolf (DLR: German Aerospace Center)
Florian Adolf thinks that we need basic requirements for trustworthiness. Per-
haps we should build on the traditional robotic three basic rules: do no harm, obey,
and protect yourself. For aviation it could be: do no harm to living being (air or
ground), do no harm to other UAVs, do no harm to other objects
3.3 Discussion
The session ended with a spirited discussion about the following points:
• Autonomous systems do have minds; these minds are not easy to understand,
but they exist. To this point, somebody added that unpredictability is the key
factor as shown by the robotic experience described earlier.
• The analogy to driving licenses was the next topic. Somebody brought up the
time to learn (16/18 years old) but the point was made that AI could do it
faster. This was not resolved as shown by the last remark that there is an age
to trust ability to mitigate risk and we do not know what this age correlation
is for AI.
• At this point, it was brought up that autonomy does not mean strong artificial
intelligence (AI). Somebody remarked that the problem with weak AI is that
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you have to build learning in rules, which led to the response that it is not
true and weak AI can learn.
• The last discussion point was about certification. Perhaps shooting for full
certification is wrong. Maybe we just need to certify the health monitoring
system. There was broad agreement on having an envelope that prevents you
from becoming unsafe; the idea of runtime assurance came back several times.
It does not solve everything: how do you assure that you go into a true safe
state? It was then suggested that it could be demonstrated on easier missions
first. The final comment was that mitigation is a second step. We should first
focus on monitoring; it is the first problem to solve.
• The statement was made that the more intelligent a system, the safer it is. On
the other hand, another statement was made that increasing system sophis-
tication increased its vulnerabilities. Cyber-security was brought up at this
point too.
• Regulation is still a major issue. Even for simple missions that involve agri-
culture, it is extremely hard to obtain permission to fly them. There must be
a pilot on the ground for each autonomous vehicle so that they can take over if
needed. Often, drones must be tethered to obtain permission. The regulatory
aspect does not seem to be easily addressable at the moment.
4 Session 2: Methods for Enabling Autonomy
In this session, we discussed current and upcoming techniques that are driving au-
tonomous system development in aviation and the need for new assurance tech-
niques in order to enable greater assured functionality for autonomous systems.
The initial list of topics of interest included the design, manufacture, fielding, main-
tenance and retirement of autonomous systems, including relevant elements such as
COA/Certification and regulatory approval. Architectures for autonomy were also
discussed. Presentations and discussions addressed mostly the design and fielding
of autonomous systems and what has been done, or need to be done, to obtain
regulatory approval.
We began this session with subject matter expert presentations, addressing the
issues inherent in designing and fielding multiple types of autonomous platforms
with differing mission capabilities and assurance levels. We then formed moder-
ated breakout groups to explore the themes of human-machine teaming, trust in
autonomy, and V&V challenges for complex/adaptive/learning systems.
4.1 Talks
John Valasek (Texas A&M University)
John Valasek described the effort his group at Texas A&M takes to design UAVs
and to evaluate their performance in the field. He touched briefly on what was
10
needed to obtain CoAs to fly these UAVs at a facility in a sparsely populated area.
He also mentioned that they operated at or slightly above class G airspace, which
made life easier in terms of regulatory approval. Here are some of his main points.
All his UAVs have a risk management process layer, which has been inspired
by processes used in the NAS and at Boeing. UAS pilot certification has not been
a problem at all. However, since the work is funded by and targeted at Air Force
operations, they had to go through a series of USAF review boards. Overall they
always perform a deep fault analysis for even the simplest functions.
The intelligent part of his UAS resides in the Intelligent Supervisor/Decision
Support Tool. It performs hyper-trapezoidal fuzzy logic model inference. In general,
they have tried to put the intelligence in the outer loops, which makes assurance an
unconventional problem. John Valasek also mentioned that they were never given
a hard time about the non-conventional part of their control system. Learning or
adaptation were not on the minds of the USAF review boards they went through.
Eric Johnson (Georgia Tech)
Eric Johnson presented two cases studies of UAVs trying to address specific
grand challenges for autonomy.
His first case study consists of a UAV helicopter having to find a building (marked
with a specific sign), find an opening to enter (it took 3 or 4 attempts to find it), go
inside and read some display (they had no success in entering the building through
a window). Their design philosophy relies on a pyramid of maturity. In essence they
keep building on top of elements with greater (or at least equal-level) maturity. It
allows them to define a maturity scale for their research in a way similar to the
TRL scale. Their adaptive control system was amongst the most mature of their
components. They drew two big lessons from this challenge. First, use simpler
components, and second, these systems are still too complex to ever be fully tested
in real life.
His second case study consists of finding and driving an evader to a specific loca-
tion for capture. Two unmanned aircraft collaborate to accomplish this. This mis-
sion has aspects of collision avoidance, terrain avoidance, and collaborative search.
The main lesson they drew from this challenge was to use daisy-chained operators
so that each of them can control N aircraft. The regulators for this challenge knew
there was an adaptive controller but it did not attract additional scrutiny. John
Valasek added that they had the same situation and the fact that humans had the
ability to take control manually was enough to ease the concerns of the challenge
regulators.
4.2 Breakout sessions
There were three breakout sessions with the following themes:
• Technology Transition and Establishing Trust.
• Human-Machine Teaming.
• V&V challenges for complex/adaptive/learning systems.
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4.2.1 Human-Machine Teaming
Participants:
• Kerianne Gross, AFRL (chair)
• Devesh Bhatt, Honeywell Aerospace Labs
• Randy Bailey, NASA Langley
• Hai Yang Chao, University of Kansas
• Andy Thurling, AeroVironment
• Chris Thames, NASA Langley
• Lael Rudd, Lockheed Martin
• Misty Davies, NASA Ames
• Shu-Chieh Wu, NASA Ames (scribe)
• Lee Pike, Galois Inc
• David Bridges, Texas A&M
The breakout session was organized around several challenges: communication,
V&V, and security.
Communication: One of the biggest challenges is the understanding of mutual
behaviors and intent. How can you be sure that there are not mismatches?
A question was asked as to whether there were examples of good teaming. It seems
to be hard to achieve a good balance. If the autonomy is too good, it leads to
over-reliance by the people. If the autonomy is not good enough, it leads to a lack
of trust in the autonomy by the people.
A core assumption by the group was that humans will be involved in the process in
some role. It is important not to preclude the operator from getting control back
from the system.
There was consensus in the group that we need to better understand teams of
humans in order to apply the best practices to human-machine teaming. Cockpit
communication has a particular cadence for example, which yields trust. It is im-
portant for expectations to be based on prior interactions.
We need research on what measurements need to be taken from the human so
that the autonomy understands state and intent of the human.
V&V: In order to understand and improve V&V approaches, we need to try mul-
tiple V&V approaches for the same problems. We never get to do this.
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Where are the National V&V centers? How can we get the necessary data? (sys-
tems, requirements, etc.) How do we account for the human contribution (e.g.,
measurements etc.) when we are doing V&V of human-machine systems? How do
we measure the software? Is there a way to compare those V&V measurements
when we do V&V at the system level?
There is a tendency to assess the human part of the system with probabilistic ap-
proaches, and the software part of the system with absolutes.
To what extent will the right human-machine teaming happen naturally if we allow
the system to evolve? Is it even possible to smoothly evolve or are there dangerous
and safe islands?
How do we do validation? How do we make sure that the automation is appro-
priate and transparent for the mission? How much information needs to be shared
between the automation and people depends on the mission.
We need an equivalent of the Cooper-Harper rating for the mix of human and
machine.
Security: When it comes to security, many of the issues are societal; for exam-
ple, basic privacy principles must be respected when evaluating pilots. In general,
humans and automation pose very different security risks. Humans are not secure
systems. However, humans are less likely to fall prey to denial-of-service attacks.
General Points: More general discussion then followed on several aspects of human
machine teaming. Topics included how to take into account workload in order to
efficiently perform division of labor, how we can ensure safe transitioning of control,
whether we could create classes of missions with similar human-machine teaming
needs so that we can apply similar teaming and V&V strategies, and how V&V
could incorporate issues of workload and degree of human engagement in order to
properly assess the safety of a mission.
4.2.2 Technology Transition and Establishing Trust
Participants:
• Natesh Manikoth, FAA (chair)
• Andrew Lacher (MITRE)
• Natalia Alexandrov (NASA Langley)
• Jim Murphy (NASA Ames)
• Ben Di Vito (NASA Langley)
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• Guillaume Brat (NASA Ames)
The breakout session started with preliminary discussion about the current cer-
tification process and the place of trust in the current system. Here are some of the
main points that were discussed:
• This breakout session started with a quick reminder of the current airworthi-
ness certification processes, especially for software since software is often at
the core of an autonomy solution. Current process relies on the application of
DO-178C, which is a process that promotes quality and rigor (and thus, gen-
erate trust through these attributes) rather than generating hard evidences
for safety. It is also worthy to note that the current process trusts the de-
velopment actors since checking DO-178C often resides in the hands of DER
(Designated Engineering Representatives) who are employed by the company
developing the product and not the FAA.
• Now, this trust is well placed because the air travel is very safe. In fact it
would be very hard to make it safer than it is today. Yet as we go through the
transition of allowing autonomous systems in our air space, the public expects
that safety will remain at current level or improve if possible. In the eyes of
the public, safety has to be an increasing monotonic function.
• The group then discussed the various reasons for introducing more autonomy,
starting with the push for reducing crew. The cargo industry would obviously
benefit from such a reduction and could be an early adopter since they are
not carrying passengers, hence the safety requirements are less. On the other
hand, airlines could also benefit from more autonomy as they always strive
to reduce their operating cost. In both cases, we need to start with taking a
closer look at the role humans play with regards to safety and why the public
feels more safe with a human in charge. By the way, it shows that trust is
relative to roles; we could probably accept more readily autonomous cabin
service rather than pilot replacement with autonomy.
• Now there is another dimension to consider. The trust of the public in an
airline is highly dependent on the airline service history. However, the trust
placed by the FAA in the airlines are probably more dependent on the certi-
fication of their operating processes, e.g., crew training, maintenance, and so
on.
• Then the group moved to the new actors in aviation such as the companies
pushing autonomous package delivery or other new business models involving
heavy use of drones. These systems are being perceived as non determinis-
tic, even though the source of non determinism is probably coming from the
environment. In any case, UAVs are seen as relying on new technologies like
adaptive control or some kind of learning. This is a new technology that
requires new certification processes.
This last point was a good segue for the group to move to the second part of the
session and focus on the challenges ahead:
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• Going deeper into the role humans play with regard to safety, the group ad-
vocating taking a closer look at the decision making process especially when
it shifts from humans to machines. In that respect the interface between air
traffic controllers and pilots is also of great importance as the potential for am-
biguities is always present. We need to separate the function being performed
(and its contribution to safety) and the current way its being realized; this
should inform us as to whether it is advisable to replace humans by machines.
As we mention before, safety and trust are relative to roles.
• Now it also led us to examine the notions of accountability and liability and
the roles they play in trust. The general feeling is that if you can be made
accountable or liable for accidents and their consequences, then you are more
likely to pay attention to safety. If the function is done by a machine who
becomes accountable? The airlines or the autonomy developer? The bottom
line is that accountability and liability are key levers in air transportation
safety.
• On the side of the new concerns with regard to autonomy is security. How
do we ensure that malicious actors are not in control? Safety and security go
hand in hand and should not be separated anymore.
• Lastly, a huge concern is that commercial development is faster than certifi-
cation, both in coming up with new certification processes and going through
certification processes. This was already a problem with the current systems,
and, it will be even more of a concern with the influx of new industry actors,
which are accustomed to fast moving markets. Note that commercial devel-
opment can also outpaced the ability to generate trust. Service histories will
be shorter and technology will involve faster that we can build trust for it.
4.2.3 V&V Challenges for Complex/Adaptive/Learning Systems
Participants:
• Dimitra Giannakopoulou (scribe)
• Florian Adolf, DLR
• Robert Moore, Embry Riddle
• Thomas Apker, Naval Research Laboratories
• Christopher Torens, DLR
• Sangeeth Ponnusami, Airbus
• Joerg Dittrich, DLR
• Zohaib Mian, United Technologies Research Center
• Shankar Natarajan, SRI
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• Greg Dorais, NASA Ames
• Yu Gu, West Virginia University
• Natasha Neogi, NASA Langley
The first part of this break-out session focused on having each participant iden-
tify the one characteristic of complex/adaptive/learning systems that is the most
challenging and pressing to address. The list of characteristics is provided below.
• Autonomous systems must monitor their environment and must make inter-
pretations about it.
– Also, how do we classify noisy sensor data?
– How do they do learning from that? Current autonomous systems cannot
learn by analogy.
• There are needs for
– determining what are the actual requirements.
– identifying and stating explicitly assumptions between different compo-
nents for adequate integration.
– defining how to test adaptation and how to identify scenarios that endure
that adaptation is appropriate in all important cases?
– identifying an adequate notion of test coverage for such systems.
– defining new methods to evaluate quality of systems that deal with un-
certainty: what is good enough and where is the bar?
– defining proper failure modes.
∗ How can we take into account all the problems that can occur and
test if the system reacts appropriately without making the cost of
testing prohibitively expensive?
– achieving architectural simplicity and modularity, leading to decoupling
the analysis of the different parts of the system, with potentially different
strategies for components with different characteristics (e.g. adaptive
components vs. more traditional ones).
∗ Scalability is also an issue.
– defining a new certification standard so that one can gain certification
credit for theoretical proofs, and incorporate alternative techniques for
achieving certification.
The question posed in the second part of the session was whether existing tech-
nologies could be used or extended towards the V&V of such systems, or whether
fundamentally new and different approaches are needed. The topics discussed are
listed below.
• Assurance
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– We need to come up with metrics of safety for learning (as opposed to
non-learning) systems.
• Requirement aspects
– Identification of requirements specific to these types of systems is needed
to enable the application of V&V techniques.
– We also need to develop techniques for transforming natural language
requirements into formal ones.
– Requirements must be considered as tests for the system to pass; in
general, we need to rethink the process associated with requirements and
provide education for better writing of requirements and associated tests.
• V&V aspects
– Formal methods must be implemented in a scalable fashion potentially
with contract-based design.
– There is a lack of high-fidelity physical models - having them would make
the development of adaptive systems much better.
– There is a need for probabilistic reasoning (both spatial and temporal)
and inferring models from data.
– There is a need for developing hybrid (as opposed to software only) so-
lutions that combine digital and analog/physical systems.
– Methods to determine the level of verification that should happen off-line
and the residual risk being dealt online and at runtime.
• Design
– Novel formalisms and methods are needed to address the characteristics
that are specific to adaptive systems.
– We must develop novel architectural approaches; knowledge-based archi-
tecture was brought up as an example, where rules describe how a system
evolves.
– We also need design support tools to mitigate the risk and development
cost, e.g., maybe aircraft that does not harm anyone if it crashes?
5 Session 3: Managing Key Issues for Assured Auton-
omy
In this session, we examined several key challenges that directly impact our ability
to generate assurance arguments for increasingly autonomous systems. Topics that
were addressed include human-machine interaction in the context of increasingly
autonomous systems, the management of uncertainty, and the management and
mitigation of communications criticality.
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We began with a talk exploring the effects of human-machine teaming on au-
tonomous systems, followed by a panel about uncertainty management and mitigat-
ing the effects of communications criticality. We finished with a set of lightning-fast
(5-minute) talks for all assurance of autonomy themes.
• Goals: What aspects that are unique to autonomy also make it difficult to
assure (both safety and certification)? Can you give concrete examples for
each aspect?
• SME talk: Steve Young (NASA Langley)
• Panel: Steve Young (NASA Langley), Kerianne Gross (AFRL), Jim Murphy
(NASA Ames), Natalia Alexandrov (NASA Langley), Mats Heimdahl (Uni-
versity of Minnesota)
• Panel Audience: 50/40 approx
• Strengths
– Lightning talks encouraged participation from audience members who
had not previously provided input (non-traditional participants)
Summary of ideas discussed:
• Need to understand how we achieve high levels of assurance without human
functioning in traditional safety critical role
• Automotive industry cited as an example for deployment of autonomous sys-
tems
• More call for certifying what should not happen.
• More proposals to go to runtime monitoring and assurance.
• More calls to look at role of humans.
• More calls for more data and being open.
• More thinking that liability and accountability will drive the standards. Reg-
ulation may eventually come from the legal system.
• Calls for:
– model validation.
– use for compositional verification for fighting complexity.
– local control.
– cybersecurity.
– architecture with trusted, deterministic layers.
– cost models.
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• Acknowledgement that current methods are not sufficient.
General Observation: The current approach to safety is that we constrain the
behavior space in order to get away with not being able to predict all possible
outcomes. For example, to constrain the airspace we use procedures, remain within
visual line of sight etc. A potential new approach to V&V would be to set the
constraints very broadly and learn as we fly, and thus improve integrity over time.
Another approach, assuming that we are not able to fully verify autonomy, is to
introduce protective measures. Geo-fencing, a popular example, tries to restrict the
operational space of an autonomous mission. As another example, NASA Langley
has developed a highly assured stand alone module that can be attached to a UAV,
which monitors and predicts for non-conforming behavior (see sub-section on the
talk of Steve Young). Thus, a potential approach to V&V would be to monitor
novel algorithms at runtime, by having them shadow real flight data and see how
they compare to actual pilot behavior.
5.1 Talk
Steve Young (NASA Langley)
Steve Young started by giving many examples of existing autonomous functions:
ACAS, GCAS, interval spacing etc. He then followed with the statement that we
have to think of how big systems (vehicles, environment, ATM) interact. Most of
the time we can bound the performance of systems, including autonomous systems,
and it helps in analyzing them.
Steve Young followed with a few remarks on the human contribution to safety,
which was a topic raised the day before. He thinks that we should keep the human at
least as a monitor and as an independent (for the system) observer. Yet he is not sure
that we can truly quantify the human contribution to safety. For assurance we need
to provide trusted information to the decision maker. He added that information
integrity requires at least two independent sources. That led to some remarks on
V&V, in which we should check our assumptions and allow for learning as we go.
We should also record everything to get more data for deploying new systems.
For vehicles, Steve Young argued for the deployment of reliable autonomous
safety-net technology, especially for unmanned system. This included ideas like run-
time monitoring, assurance and certifying what should not happen (again a recurring
theme in this workshop). Steve Young contrasted what the public demands with
what industry demands. The public demands affordability, safety, security, and
privacy. Industry tries to address public demand but it also wants to minimize
liability.
Next Steve Young described an example, in which a small box can be attached
to a UAV for monitoring for non-conformance, and inform the pilot (or auto-pilot)
that the UAV is getting too close to constraints (similar to geo-fencing, but with
assurance arguments). His solution does not rely only on GPS. Responding to
questions from the audience, Steve Young said that
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• the integrity of the localization system can be achieved by having two inde-
pendent systems, which can use independent frequencies to avoid correlation,
and,
• the problem of outdated information is already addressed in the newly updated
database standards.
5.2 Panel Discussion
Natalia Alexandrov (NASA Langley)
Natalia Alexandrovs presentation revolved around the main idea that we will
have to deal with a primordial soup of uncontrolled UAVs, with potentially unco-
operative participants. There are two approaches we could take to dealing with
this fact. (Case 1): to control, you have to have a tacit agreement that the par-
ticipants want to be controlled (and regulated); of course, higher density of traffic
might create a tractability problem. (Case 2): benign participants must change
and be more survivable (e.g., design more maneuverable aircraft). Thus, we need a
control architecture for cooperative participants and we need to design for control-
lability, robustness, resilience, and adaptability at all scales. There is also a need to
manage contingencies for non-cooperative and malicious participants; conforming
participants will need detection and protection capabilities. Natalia Alexandrov is
in favor of local control (rather than a large centralized control system) and believes
that we need better situational awareness and cybersecurity. She also argued for a
tighter coupling of airspace design and aircraft design. Her conclusion is that we
need complexity-bounded multi-scale self-organized decision making.
Kerianne Gross (Air Force Research Laboratories)
Kerianne Gross presented the point of view of the Air Force on autonomous
systems. USAF sees autonomy as game changing. Human-machine teaming and
interaction, as well as trust are seen as very important in this context. Therefore,
AFRL studies the changes in human roles carefully.
She presented the example of the automated collision avoidance technology for
the F16, which automatically maneuvers an F16 out of the way in case of a possible
collision. Its requirements are: do no harm and do not interfere (which is the tough-
est for Air Force pilots). They have seen good pilot acceptance; in fact they see
almost too much trust from the pilots. Their other big challenge is the integration
of independently-developed autonomous systems, especially when it comes to V&V.
They are investing in the use of modular/compositional V&V. They also wonder
how to formalize autonomous system models so that we can do mathematical anal-
ysis. AFRL is doing a lot of physical testing to validate their models. Ideally the
compositional framework would help in combining the evidence.
Jim Murphy (NASA Ames Research Center)
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Jim Murphy is the main designer for the UAS in the NAS testbed at NASA. He
therefore drew from his testbed experience to think about autonomy. He pointed
out that the first thing to do is to understand the domain but that you almost
always miss requirements. So, this needs to be taken into account in the design; it
needs to be extensible. He is also a big proponent of open access (to gather feedback
from the whole community) and data collection. He thinks that it is critical that
everybody (including academia) can use these systems.
Mats Heimdahl (University of Minnesota)
Automation and tools are very useful, especially in V&V. There is a reluctance
to use these tools (same as autonomy) because we do not have enough data. How-
ever, we are already in trouble: autonomy is coming and our old techniques are
not applicable. For autonomy, it is more a validation problem than a verification
problem: do we have the requirements right? We need to think more about system
safety, rather than focusing on software. For autonomy, we need a sort of Turing
test for driver. Regulations will come from the legal system: liability will drive these
regulations. The actual problems will appear because of the participation of small
players; big players have too much skin in the game, they have to be more careful.
Assurance cases are touted as a possible resolution, but they are not going to be
water-tight. We will need to rely on beliefs, and we need to know how to fold these
beliefs into our analysis.
Further Discussion:
Some of the topics that were raised during the panel discussion include the
following:
Can we ensure that software is trained for all situations that may occur? We do
not have a good answer to this question yet, even though it is important. The audi-
ence and panelists discussed the issue of licensing, and it was mentioned that AFRL
has a study on a licensing paradigm. The Toyota unintended acceleration problem
was presented as an example of humans not understanding what the automation is
doing.
When safety measures are introduced to ensure safe boundaries for a UAS, such
as geo-fencing for example, one would still need to detect if the safety measure
will fail. Finally, since in reality autonomous software is non-deterministic, what is
the point of testing with deterministic inputs? We do not have good probabilistic
evaluation methods, but we can use bounds as test oracles.
5.3 Lightning fast talks
Mark Skoog (NASA Armstrong) described his work on developing an expand-
able variable-autonomy architecture with run-time assurance. A safety case is de-
veloped to support it.
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Joerg Dittrich (DLR) described their work on pilotless aircraft and made some
good points by introducing data and statistics. He claimed that solutions to low
reliability of UAS may not involve classical certification methods that may over-
restrict the operations. Rather, approaches that avoid damage their surroundings
may be more realistic. He brought as an example a German UAS equipped with a
parachute that is deployed automatically if the UAS malfunctions and is to fall on
the ground. He also argued that affordability of the verification techniques has to
be a major driver given the fast rate at which UASs are introduced in the airspace/
The use of automated tools as well as benchmarks could contribute to affordability.
6 Session 4: Assurance Tools and Techniques for Trusted
Autonomy
In this session, we explored new concepts and methods to facilitate the Verification
and Validation (V&V) and Certification of increasingly autonomous systems. Topics
that were addressed included tools and techniques that can be used to assess and
assure safety and security. We also investigated tools and techniques that engender
trust in increasingly autonomous systems on behalf of designers, evaluators, users
and the general public.
• Goals: Does autonomy require a shift in assurance processes?
• Panel: Lee Pike (Galois), Natarajan Shankar (SRI), Cristoph Torens (DLR
German Aerospace Center), Darren Cofer (Rockwell Collins), Irene Gregory
(NASA Langley)
• Panel Audience: 30 approximately
• Strengths
• Expertise in V&V tools well represented on panel
Brief Summary:
Barriers to certification: Well defined requirements, Verifiable behavior, Pre-
dictable performance, No unintended functionality.
Are the problems that we discuss particular to autonomy or are they systems
problems?
Architecture provides an opportunity for mitigating the assurance of autonomy.
Examples include
• geo-fencing (spatial constraining),
• runtime monitoring (perform recovery actions when unanticipated problematic
situations occur), and
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• ability to turn adaptive behavior on or off (e.g., switching adaptive behavior
off during abnormal conditions, or engaging adaptive behavior to recover on
conditions where you would lose aircraft anyway).
The topic of licensing versus certifying was also discussed a lot in this session.
It was explored further and brought up the following questions.
• How do we license humans?
• How do we trust humans to perform a job?
• Are our fears of autonomy unfounded?
• Do we really test humans that much more, or, we actually trust them without
much evidence?
The other point being brought up many times is that we should only consider
new algorithms if there is a clear benefit. For a safety-critical system, we should
also show that they are safe. In principle we should be able to modify our processes
to accommodate autonomy if the benefits are clear.
6.1 Panel
Lee Pike (Galois)
Lee Pike s main statement was that autonomous system challenges are just sys-
tems challenges. The real challenge resides in modeling the environment and its
uncertainties. Therefore Lee Pike suggested that the community focuses on proba-
bilistic techniques to approximate a correct environment, e.g., hidden Markov mod-
els. Lee Pike also thinks that we should try to characterize the types of requirements
faced in autonomy and focus on behavioral bounding boxes.
Natarajan Shankar (SRI)
Natarajan Shankar claimed that the challenges presented by autonomy are not
really new and that we have been dealing with them for a long time under the name
of automation.
For him architecture is the key issue. One must design a system for assurance.
The goal is the creation of an efficient argument (one that is easily refuted if it is
wrong). He advocated an approach based on evidence, in which one makes claims
and assumptions, and then one uses an architecture, arguments, and evidence ob-
tained using formal method tools to build assurance.
He also presented a system architecture in which a Learning/Monitoring module
checks assurance constraints and diagnoses failures. The assurance model module
contains the parametric system model employed in the assurance case.
Cristoph Torens (DLR German Aerospace Center)
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Cristoph Torrens presented an approach to get certification credit for an au-
tonomous aircraft based on formal reasoning. The aircraft (RPAS) is a 15 kg rotor-
craft, for which 3-D obstacles are mapped into a 3-D representation. The goal of his
research is to answer the following questions: (1) How do we get RPAS certified?
(2) How can autonomous behavior be modeled? (3) What degree of autonomy is
needed? and (4) How can we have affordable certification credit for RPAS? His
approach is based on formal methods.
System Requirements/Formal requirements have a huge impact on the certifi-
cation of a system: Half of the certification safety objectives concern system re-
quirements, and how they are met (means of compliance). Requirements can be
properly formalized and matched with general GN&C systems. The requirements
elicitation process is done with templates (based on LTL formulae) to obtain semi-
formal requirements. These templates are designed for engineers not familiar with
requirements management. The objective is to ensure that each low level require-
ment can be verified. The formalization is currently done manually, but the use of
templates facilitates this task.
Oﬄine and online runtime monitoring is also supported by his approach. Run-
time monitoring is scalable, and represents low-hanging fruit in terms of effort, when
working with formalized requirements. They use runtime monitoring to check traces
of the system. For example, one can implement a runtime monitor for geo-fencing.
This is useful for autonomy, for certification purposes. Cristoph Torrens claims that
we do not have to care if the system is autonomous or not, because the implemen-
tation of the flight system is unimportant.
Darren Cofer (Rockwell Collins)
Darren Cofer presented a pragmatic approach for certifying autonomous systems
based on existing standards (ARP 4761, 4754A, DO-297, DO 254, DO-178C). We al-
ready have DO-333 for getting certification credit on traditional systems. However,
autonomous systems have new functionality based on adaptive and intelligent algo-
rithms. As for the question of non-determinism often cited for autonomous systems,
it usually comes from concurrency (multi-threaded computation in which execution
impacts the result), uncertain existence of solutions, probabilistic algorithms, or
environmental non-determinism.
For the most important and challenging aspects of certification, Darren Cofer
listed: (1) well-defined requirements, (2) verifiable behavior, (3) predictable perfor-
mance, (4) absence of unintended functionality, (5) complete assessment of behavior,
(6) structural coverage metrics on code, and (7) transparent design.
For autonomous systems, Darren Cofer advocates the following mitigation strate-
gies:
• Education (expertise gap between industry and regulators);
• Modified Certification Standards (new technology supplements), e.g., create
supplement for adaptive algorithms;
• Alternative Certification Methods (assurance cases);
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• New Verification Approaches (based on formal methods, probabilistic tech-
niques etc.);
• Architectural Mitigation: bounded behavior of autonomy function, (e.g., con-
sidering a simplex controller vs. Adaptive function) engaged to recover aircraft
during loss of surfaces, which could only be enacted during abnormal catas-
trophic conditions
• Licensing vs. Certification Paradigm Shift: we trust human operators because
of training, operating experience, demonstrated performance in normal and
emergency conditions, and an exam by licensing authority.
Darren Cofer concluded by presenting a certification challenge: if we have an
autonomy algorithm that provides significant benefit can we answer the following
questions: (1) Is the algorithm dependable? and (2) Can we produce arguments
based on evidence that the algorithm is dependable?
Irene Gregory (NASA Langley)
Irene Gregory presented a different view of the problem. She comes from a
controls background, rather than being an expert in formal methods. She actually
still sees a lot of shortcomings in formal methods, and therefore, advocates the use
of methods based on the evaluation of performance of control systems. She calls for
the practical application of this philosophical approach in categories based on risk
and innovation. As with the previous speakers, she is a proponent of bounding the
behavior of autonomous systems where one only bounds unallowable behavior. She
also made the statement that formal methods should take stochastic methods more
into account.
6.2 Lightning fast talks
Robert Moore (Embry Riddle) presented a proposed set of rule changes that
would allow model aircraft pilots of very small UASs (less than 5 lbs.) to fly au-
tonomously, including beyond line-of-sight. This was based on his experience with
flying such UASs recreationally.
7 Wrap-up session and Conclusions
The wrap up session focused on the future of the workshop. Many participants
wanted to see the workshop continue, but we discussed what venue should be picked
to associate the workshop with so that we ensure the right audience. In particular,
there was a desire to involve regulators in the discussion. We also discussed how
to avoid repeating issues that keep being discussed in such venues and how to be
more focused towards solutions. For this reason, it was suggested that we select
a topic and explore it in detail, and also that we define a challenge problem that
participants can try to tackle. NASA Armstrong volunteered to provide a challenge
problem based on their Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture (EVAA).
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